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Abstract
Many countries have introduced e-government petitioning systems,
in which a petition that gathers enough signatures triggers some polit-
ical outcome. This paper models citizens who choose whether to sign a
petition. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the petition's chance
of bringing change. The number of citizens approaches inﬁnity, while
the cost of signing is positive but low, falling within certain bounds. In
the limit, participation is increasing in the required quota of signatures.
Social welfare is decreasing in the quota. Information aggregation may
fail if individual signals are suﬃciently uninformative.
Keywords: online petitions, collective action, voting, political par-
ticipation
JEL codes: D72, H41
1 Introduction
Online petitions have become a feature of the political process in many demo-
cracies. While some petitions serve simply as a means of signalling opinion,
in a number of countries governing institutions have committed to act on
a petition if it attracts suﬃciently many signatures. In these e-government
petitioning systems, a petition signed by a certain number of citizens will be
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debated in the legislature or will trigger some other oﬃcial response1. Al-
though the legislature can still vote to reject the petition, a citizen who signs
it is not merely sending a signal, but is directly aﬀecting political outcomes,
in a manner similar to voting in a referendum.
Two features of this form of political participation stand out. First, the
number of potential participants is very large, essentially including the entire
electorate. Second, while there is a cost of participation  the time and eﬀort
required to sign an online petition  that cost is usually negligible. Because
of the very low cost, political action through online petitions is sometimes
referred to, derisively, as slacktivism.
This paper develops a model of participation in such low-cost political
action. In the model, there is a large number of citizens, who choose whether
to sign a petition, at some cost. If the petition collects a certain quota of
signatures, it will be considered by the legislature. The decision of the le-
gislature is represented by a state of the world: in state 0 it will reject the
petition, and in the complementary state 1 it will approve it. All citizens
receive an imperfect continuous signal about the state. A rejected petition
does not change the citizens' payoﬀs relative to the status quo, while a peti-
tion that is approved gives each citizen a positive payoﬀ. Thus, citizens have
imperfect information about the petition's chance of success, but are fully
informed about its value if it succeeds. Because of this, swing voter's curse
does not emerge in the model, and citizens' choice of whether to sign it is
driven by the tradeoﬀ between cost of signing the petition and the beneﬁt of
increasing its chance of success.
If signing the petition was costless, all citizens would weakly prefer to sign
it. On the other hand, if the cost was a positive constant, then a well-known
paradox of not voting would emerge: in a suﬃciently large electorate, the
probability that an individual citizen is pivotal would be low enough that no
1For instance, a petition on the UK parliament website signed by at least 100 thousand
citizens will be considered for debate in the parliament (UK Parliament, 2018). A similar
system used in Germany requires a petition to collect 50 thousand signatures within four
weeks to receive a public hearing in the national parliament (Deutsche Welle, 2017). Sim-
ilar systems are used by the White House in the US; by parliaments in Canada and Latvia;
by regional parliaments in Scotland and Queensland, Australia; as well as by a number
of municipalities (see Lindner and Riehm, 2009; Mickoleit, 2014; Grover, 2016). These
systems are fairly widely used: for example, there are over 12 thousand active petitions on
the UK parliament website, several hundred past petitions have received a response from
the government, and several dozen have been debated in the parliament.
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citizens would sign the petition2. Neither outcome seems realistic. The key
feature of this model is that the cost is positive but low. Speciﬁcally, the
paper analyses sequences of equilibria when the number of citizens goes to
inﬁnity, while the cost of signing is within certain bounds that are related to
the size of the electorate. In the limit, both the upper and the lower bound
converge to zero, but at every point along the sequence there is an interval
of small but positive costs that satisfy the bounds.
As the size of the electorate approaches inﬁnity, in the limit a randomly
selected citizen signs the petition with a probability that is distinct from
zero and from one. Hence, positive (although not universal) participation
occurs in a large electorate. In the limit, a citizen who signs the petition is
almost surely not pivotal  along the sequence, however, the probability that
a citizen is pivotal remains positive.
The paper then analyses the equilibria that emerge in large electorates.
First, it examines the eﬀect of the required quota of signatures on particip-
ation. If the cost was zero, or if it was substantially larger than the upper
bound, then participation would not depend on the quota  it would, respect-
ively, be universal, or converge to zero in a large electorate. However, when
the cost stays within the bounds of the model, increasing the quota increases
the fraction of citizens that sign the petition. Hence, a more conservative
petitioning procedure induces greater participation.
The paper also discusses the eﬀect of the minimum quota of signatures
on social welfare. In the limit, equilibrium participation depends on the
quota in such a way that all quotas produce the same political outcomes. A
lower quota, however, reduces the total cost incurred by citizens who sign
the petition. For this reason, a lower quota is socially preferable.
Finally, I analyse informational eﬃciency of the petitioning procedure. A
social planner may prefer the petition to be forwarded to the legislature in
state 1 but not in state 0. I show that in a large electorate, the petition-
ing procedure replicates these outcomes (and hence achieves informational
eﬃciency) if and only if individual signals are suﬃciently precise.
2A similar result would emerge if the cost followed a continuous distribution across
voters, unless one assumes that suﬃciently many citizens have a negative cost of sign-
ing (i.e. that they receive a payoﬀ from the act of signing). Without uncertainty, one
could construct an asymmetric equilibrium in which the number of citizens that sign a
petition exactly equals the threshold. However, such an equilibrium would be eliminated
if uncertainty is introduced (see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985, for a similar result in a
two-candidate voting setup).
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The rest of this section discusses the related literature. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 derives asymptotic equilibria. Using this equilibrium
characterisation, Section 4 analyses the eﬀect of the quota of signatures on
participation and social welfare, and studies informational eﬃciency. It also
discusses equilibrium stability, pivotality, and the role of the assumption on
the cost of signing the petition. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on petitions
and other forms of collective political action. Lohmann (1993), Banerjee and
Somanathan (2001), Battaglini and Benabou (2003), and Battaglini (2017)
look at citizens who are imperfectly informed about a state of the world.
Citizens can engage in political action to signal their information to the
decision-maker3 and induce her to select a policy that is appropriate for the
state. This paper diﬀers from that literature in two ways. First, it analyses
a limit case in which the number of voters is inﬁnite and the cost of political
action is positive but low. In this setting, the paper generates equilibria with
positive participation4. Second, this model abstracts from the signalling
role of petitions. Instead, it looks at e-government petitions, which directly
aﬀect political outcomes in a similar way to referenda: political change can
happen if the number of citizens who sign the petition exceeds an exogenous
threshold5. In particular, the fact that the threshold is exogenous makes it
possible to analyse the eﬀect of its size on participation and welfare.
The latter aspect links the paper to the literature on discrete public goods
 that is, public goods that are provided if and only if the total amount of
contributions exceeds a certain threshold (see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984,
for a classic reference). My model is similar to a common-value discrete public
good game in which the set of possible contributions is binary (signing and
not signing the petition). Two features, however, distinguish this model from
3Or to other voters, as in Lohmann (1994).
4In Lohmann (1994), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), and Battaglini and Benabou
(2003), political action is costly, but agents engage in it because their number is ﬁnite. If
the group becomes very large, participation shrinks to zero. In Battaglini (2017), parti-
cipation is generally costless; in the variant of the model in which it is costly, participation
occurs because a subset of citizens have negative costs of participation.
5In contrast, in Lohmann (1993) and Battaglini (2017) the policy-maker changes his
decision if the number of voters who engage in collective action exceeds a cutoﬀ that is
endogenously determined at the equilibrium.
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the rest of the literature. First, rather than looking at public good provision
in a group of ﬁxed size, my paper analyses a sequence of discrete public good
games in which the group size approaches inﬁnity, and the cost of contributing
stays within certain bounds6. Second, in my paper there is uncertainty about
the threshold amount of contributions required for the common-value public
good to be provided (the threshold equals some fraction of the group size
in state 1, and inﬁnity in state 0), and individuals receive imperfect private
signals about the threshold7. This, in particular, underlies the analysis of
information aggregation properties of the petition.
The fact that signing an e-government petition is similar to casting a vote
in a referendum connects the paper to the extensive literature on voting by
imperfectly informed agents. In particular, Battaglini et al. (2007), Krishna
and Morgan (2012) and Ambrus et al. (2017) have looked at ﬁnite groups of
voters who receive private signals about a payoﬀ-relevant state of the world,
and face a cost of voting8. My paper diﬀers from that literature in two ways.
First, I focus on a limit case in which the electorate is large, while the cost
belongs to a speciﬁc range, which ensures that participation remains positive
(but not universal) for any size of the electorate. This allows me to study
information aggregation and the eﬀect of quota on participation in a large
election with costly voting9. Second, in this paper the cost of voting has
a very particular form: while signing the petition is costly, voting for the
opposite alternative  that is, not signing the petition  is costless. Hence,
only voters who prefer to sign the petition face a participation dilemma. This
underlies the monotone positive eﬀect of the voting rule on participation.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature on referenda with ap-
proval quorums, in which a proposal is adopted only if a certain number
6The role of these bounds is discussed at the end of Section 4.
7Nitzan and Romano (1990), McBride (2006), Barbieri and Malueg (2010), and Kras-
teva and Yildirim (2013) examine discrete public good games in which there is uncertainty
about the threshold, but players do not receive private signals about it. More broadly, a
number of papers (e.g. Menezes et al., 2001; Laussel and Palfrey, 2003; Martimort and
Moreira, 2010) model private-value discrete public good games in which individuals have
perfect private information about their valuations of the public good (but not about the
technology of producing it).
8Costly voting has also been studied in settings that do not involve information ag-
gregation (see e.g. Borgers, 2004; Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Myatt, 2015).
9Typically, because of the well-known paradox of not voting that emerges when the
electorate is large, information aggregation in large elections has been studied under an
assumption that voting is cotless (see e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997).
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of voters support it. Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010) analyse such
referenda in a model without voting costs. Maniquet and Morelli (2015) ex-
amine approval quora in an electorate of ﬁnite size. In Herrera and Mattozzi
(2010), voting is costly, but voters are not concerned with being pivotal 
instead, each voter receives a payoﬀ from voting for her preferred alternative
that is depends on the parties' mobilisation eﬀorts. This paper, in contrast,
develops a pivotal-voter model with a large electorate and positive, though
low, cost.
2 Model
There are nr +1 citizens, who choose simultaneously whether to sign a peti-
tion. Signing the petition carries a cost cr. The pair (cr, nr), will be referred
to as the voting environment indexed by r. I will focus on equilibrium beha-
viour when the number of citizens is large. Formally, the paper will focus on
sequences of voting environments such that lim
r→∞
nr =∞.
The petition will be considered by the legislature if it gathers at least qnr
signatures, where q ∈ (0, 1).10 To simplify notation, throughout the paper
I will assume that qnr is an integer for all r. Citizens are uncertain about
the legislature's eventual decision11. Formally, there is a state of the world
θ ∈ {0, 1}. In state 0 the legislature rejects the petition, while in state 1
it approves the petition. If the petition is approved by the legislature, all
citizens (both those who signed the petition, and those who did not) receive a
payoﬀ of 1, while a petition that is rejected gives a payoﬀ of 0 to all citizens12.
Ex ante, the probability that the state equals 1 is pi.
10One could also specify the model by saying that the petition will be considered by
the legislature if it gathers at least q (nr + 1) signatures. Both speciﬁcations produce the
same results because as r →∞, qnr and q (nr + 1) converge to each other.
11For example, citizens might not know which members of the legislature will be present
at the session in which the petition will be considered, or what their positions are on the
proposal contained in the petition.
12In reality, of course, some citizens may oppose the petition. One could easily extend
the model to consider such cases. Suppose that a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of citizens receive
a positive payoﬀ from the petition if it succeeds, while the rest receive a negative payoﬀ.
The latter citizens will never sign the petition and can be omitted from the analysis. Then
all subsequent results can be derived by replacing nr with n˜r ≡ αnr and labelling by q the
number such that the petition will be considered by the legislature if it gathers at least
qn˜r signatures.
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At the beginning of the game, each citizen i receives a private signal
si ∈ [s, s]. In each state θ, signals of all citizens are drawn independently
from cdf Fθ with density fθ. Let s denote a generic realisation of the signal.
Given a signal s, let h (s) = pif1(s)
pif1(s)+(1−pi)f0(s) be the posterior probability
that the true state is 1. I will make the following assumptions about signal
distributions:
Assumption 1.
f0(s)
f1(s)
is strictly increasing in s.
Assumption 2. f1 (s) is strictly positive for all s ∈ [s, s].
Assumption 1 imposes a standard monotone likelihood property on signal
distributions. In particular, it implies that h (s) is decreasing in s. Assump-
tion 2 ensures that h (s) is positive for any signal realisation.
After citizens observe their signals, they simultaneously choose whether
to sign the petition at a cost cr. In any voting environment (that is, for any
size of the electorate) I will assume that the cost is strictly positive, but not
too large. Speciﬁcally, I will assume the following about the cost:
Assumption 3. There exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) and some r such that λnr ≤
cr ≤ e2pi h(s)√q(1−q)nr for all r ≥ r
For any voting environment r, Assumption 3 deﬁnes an upper and a lower
bound on the cost of signing the petition. The signiﬁcance of these bounds
is discussed in Section 4.
Let σi (s) be citizen i's strategy, that is, her probability of signing the
petition after receiving signal s. The paper will focus on symmetric equilibria,
in which σi (s) = σ (s), ∀i.
3 Equilibria
First, note that a strategy proﬁle in which every citizen signs the petition
irrespective of her signal cannot be an equilibrium, because in this case the
number of signatures will be at least qnr with probability 1, and hence every
citizen would gain by deviating. Consider instead a strategy proﬁle in which
no citizen signs the petition, irrespective of the signal. If qnr > 1, no citizen
is pivotal under this strategy proﬁle, and hence no citizen gains by deviating.
Thus, abstention by all citizens is an equilibrium. For the rest of the analysis,
7
I will focus on equilibria in which each citizen signs the petition with a
positive probability. I will refer to these as positive participation equilibria.
Consider a voting environment r. Take a citizen i who has received signal
si. If the petition gathers at least qnr signatures, citizen i will receive a payoﬀ
of 1 if θ = 0, and a payoﬀ of 0 if θ = 0. Let pr (k) denote the probability
that at least k citizens sign the petition conditional on the true state being 1.
Then citizen i's expected payoﬀ will equal h (si) pr (qnr − 1)− cr if she signs
the petition, and h (si) pr (qnr) if she does not. She then signs the petition if
and only if h (si) [pr (qnr − 1)− pr (qnr)] ≥ cn, where [pr (qnr − 1)− pr (qnr)]
is the usual probability that citizen i is pivotal.
Let yr be the equilibrium probability that a randomly selected citizen
signs the petition when the true state is 1. Then citizen i will sign the
petition if and only if
h (si)
(
nr
qnr
)
yqnrr (1− yr)(1−q)nr ≥ cr (1)
Assumption 1 implies that h (si) is strictly decreasing. Hence, an equi-
librium in a given voting environment r is characterised by a cutoﬀ sr such
that a citizen signs a petition if and only if her signal is below sr. The equi-
librium in which no citizen signs the petition is given by sr = s. A positive
participation equilibrium exists whenever there is some sr > s that solves
h (sr)
(
nr
qnr
)
F1 (s
r)qnr [1− F1 (sr)](1−q)nr = cr (2)
We can now simplify
(
qnr
nr
)
by applying the bounds on factorial derived in
Robbins (1955). This yields the following technical result:
Lemma 1.
√
2pi
e2
≤ ( nr
qnr
)
qqnr (1− q)(1−q)nr√q (1− q)nr ≤ e2pi for all r.
This is suﬃcient to show that when r is suﬃciently large, a positive
participation equilibrium exists:
Lemma 2. There exists r such that for all r ≥ r, there exists at least one
sr > s at which (2) holds.
On its own, Lemma 2 does not mean that participation remains strictly
positive as r →∞ (i.e. as the electorate becomes arbitrarily large), because
sr may be converging to s. If that is the case, participation would converge
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to zero, and the standard paradox of not voting would emerge. Subsequent
analysis, however, will show that this is not the case.
Note that sr = s cannot be an equilibrium by the reasoning given at
the beginning of this section. Thus, sr ∈ (s, s) in any positive participation
equilibrium. By Assumption 2, F1 has full support on [s, s], and hence 0 <
F1 (s
r) < 1. Using this, we can express
(
nr
qnr
)
from (2), and substitute it into
the double inequality in Lemma 1. This yields the following condition that
must hold for any positive participation equilibrium cutoﬀ sr:
(√
2pi
e2
) 1
nr
≤
[
cr
h (sr)
√
q (1− q)nr
] 1
nr
[
q
F1 (sr)
]q [
1− q
1− F1 (sr)
]1−q
≤
( e
2pi
) 1
nr
(3)
We are interested in the asymptotic behaviour of sr as r →∞. Formally,
consider any convergent sequence of positive participation equilibrium cutoﬀs
{sr}+∞r=0. As limr→∞
(√
2pi
e2
) 1
nr
= lim
r→∞
(
e
2pi
) 1
nr = 1, (3) implies that
lim
r→∞
c 1nrr [√q (1− q)nr
h (sr)
] 1
nr
[
q
F1 (sr)
]q [
1− q
1− F1 (sr)
]1−q = 1 (4)
This characterises the limit of any sequence of positive participation equi-
libria, as long as the limit in (4) exists. We can show its existence by showing
that c
1
nr
r converges:
Lemma 3. There exists a subsequence of voting environments for which c
1
nr
r
converges to some limit L ∈ [λ, 1].
For these subsequences, sr converges. Focusing on these subsequences,
and letting sˆ ≡ lim
r→∞
sr, we can simplify (4), as the following result states:
Lemma 4. The limit sˆ of any convergent sequence of positive participation
equilibrium cutoﬀs {sr}+∞r=0 is given by[
q
F1 (sˆ)
]q [
1− q
1− F1 (sˆ)
]1−q
=
1
L
(5)
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For s ∈ (s, s), let A (s) ≡ [F1 (s)]q [1− F1 (s)]1−q. For the subsequent
analysis, the following simple result will be useful:
Lemma 5. A (s) is strictly increasing in s for F1 (s) < q, and strictly de-
creasing in s for F1 (s) > q.
We can now derive the ﬁrst result of the paper  a characterisation of
equilibria in large electorates. These equilibria are represented by the values
of sˆ at which (5) holds. They can be characterised as follows:
Proposition 1. Take any sequence {sr}+∞r=0 of positive participation equilib-
rium cutoﬀs converging to a limit sˆ. If L = 1, then F1 (sˆ) = q. If L < 1, then
sˆ can take one of two values sˆ1, sˆ2, such that 0 < F1 (sˆ1) < q < F1 (sˆ2) < 1.
In words, if the electorate becomes arbitrarily large and the cost stays
in the interval described by Assumption 3, in the limit there exist equilibria
in which the level of participation is substantial. Speciﬁcally, there exists
a high participation equilibrium at which the fraction of citizens who sign
the petition converges to F1 (sˆ2) > q, and a low participation equilibrium
at which that fraction converges to F1 (sˆ1) < q. In both of these equilibria
that fraction is distinct from zero and from one. In the special case when
L = 1, the two positive participation asymptotic equilibria merge into a single
equilibrium, at which the fraction of citizens that sign the petition converges
to q. In addition, there also exists a zero participation equilibrium, at which
no citizen signs the petition (i.e. sˆ = s).
This equilibrium characterisation undelies the results discussed in the
next section.
4 Comparative Statics and Discussion
Eﬀect of quota on participation. We can show that all positive parti-
cipation equilibria are monotone in the quota of signatures:
Proposition 2. The limit sˆ of any convergent sequence {sr}+∞r=0 of positive
participation equilibrium cutoﬀs is strictly increasing with q.
Hence, in a large electorate, the share of citizens who sign the petition at
a positive participation equilibrium increases when the petitioning procedure
becomes more conservative.
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Equilibrium stability. Consider the general case when L < 1. How do the
two positive participation equilibrium cutoﬀs respond to a small perturbation
in strategies? Take a sequence of equilibrium cutoﬀs {sr}+∞r=0 converging to
the high participation asymptotic cutoﬀ sˆ2. Now suppose citizens deviate
to a sequence {s˜r}+∞r=0 that converges to an asymptotic cutoﬀ sˆ2 + ε, with
ε > 0 (that is, they sign the petition with a higher ex ante probability).
When r is suﬃciently large (so that s˜r is suﬃciently close to sˆ2+ ε), we have
F1 (s˜
r) > F1 (s
r) > q, and so by Lemma 5, A (s˜r) < A (sr). Thus, as a result
of the deviation, yqnrr (1− yr)(1−q)nr = A (·)nr decreases, and so each citizen's
best response, given by (1), is to sign the petition at lower values at si. Thus,
the equilibrium cutoﬀ falls, counteracting the initial deviation. Similarly, if
citizens deviate to a sequence converging to a cutoﬀ sˆ2 − ε (where ε is small
enough that F1 (sˆ2 − ε) > q), then A (·)nr increases, so the best response is
to sign the petition at higher values of si, again counteracting the deviation.
Hence, the high participation equilibrium is stable.
On the other hand, consider a sequence of equilibrium cutoﬀs {sr}+∞r=0
converging to the low participation asymptotic cutoﬀ sˆ1. Suppose citizens
deviate to a sequence
{
s˜r}+∞r=0 that converges to an asymptotic cutoﬀ sˆ1+ε forsome ε > 0 that is small enough that F1 (sˆ1 + ε) < q. When r is suﬃciently
large, we have F1 (s
r) < F1
(
s˜r) < q, and by Lemma 5, A (s˜r) > A (sr). Then
yqnrr (1− yr)(1−q)nr = A (·)nr increases, and so each citizen's best response is
to sign the petition at higher values at si, reinforcing the initial perturbation
of sr. Similarly, if citizens deviate to a sequence converging to a cutoﬀ sˆ1−ε,
then A (·)nr decreases, and the best response is to sign the petition at lower
values of si, reinforcing the deviation. Thus, the low participation equilibrium
is unstable.
To summarise, for L < 1, there are two stable asymptotic equilibria (the
zero participation equilibrium and the high participation equilibrium), as
well as one unstable intermediate equilibrium.
Pivotality. Suppose L = 1. When θ = 1, the probability of a given citizen
signing the petition approaches q as r → ∞. Hence, the outcome in state
1 is almost surely very close when the electorate is large. This is similar to
Theorem 2 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), which shows a similar result
in a large election with costless participation but with uncertainty about the
correct alternative.
However, in the more general case when L < 1, the probability of a given
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citizen signing the petition in state 1 converges either to F1 (sˆ1) < q, or (at a
stable asymptotic equilibrium) to F1 (sˆ2) > q. Thus, at a stable asymptotic
equilibrium, when θ = 1, the petition almost surely succeeds with a strictly
positive margin. In other words, as r →∞, in the limit citizens who sign the
petition know that they are almost surely not pivotal. Along the sequence,
however, at every r the probability of being pivotal is suﬃciently large that
enough citizens strictly prefer to sign the petition.
Social welfare. Which value of q is socially optimal? Proposition 1 im-
plies that in state 1, as r → ∞, the petition almost surely succeeds at the
stable high participation equilibrium, and almost surely fails at the other two
equilibria. In state 0, of course, the petition will always be rejected. These
outcomes do not depend on the value of q. Hence, out of two values of q, we
would prefer the one that achieves the outcome at a lower cost to citizens.
At each state θ ∈ {0, 1}, in a given voting environment r, the total cost
equals crnrFθ (s
r). In the limit, as r →∞, this converges to Fθ (sˆ) lim
r→∞
crnr,
as long as lim
r→∞
crnr exists. Assumption 3 implies that for all r ≥ r we have
nrλ
nr ≤ crnr ≤ e
2pi
√
nr
q (1− q)h (s)
As r → ∞, the lower bound on crnr converges to zero, while the upper
bound becomes inﬁnite. Hence, lim
r→∞
crnr, if it exists, can take any weakly
positive value. If lim
r→∞
crnr = 0, then the total cost converges to zero, and
hence all petitioning procedures are welfare-equivalent. However, if crnr con-
verges to a ﬁnite positive limit, then in the limit the total cost is proportional
to Fθ (sˆ). Together with Proposition 2, this implies the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose L < 1. Let r →∞, and take any sequence of voting
environments such that crnr converges to a limit. If lim
r→∞
crnr = 0, then all
values of q are welfare-equivalent. If lim
r→∞
crnr > 0, then the eﬃciency of the
petitioning procedure is strictly decreasing with q.
Hence, a lower quota of signatures is preferable to a higher quota.
Information aggregation. When θ = 1, the petition, if it gathers suﬃ-
ciently many signatures, gives every citizen a payoﬀ of 1. Since the cost of
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signing is below 1 when r is suﬃciently large, it is socially optimal for the
petition to succeed in state 1. Suppose that in addition, a social planner
prefers the petition not to be forwarded to the legislature in state 0. This
can be because, for example, the time that legislators spend on discussing
the petition has some (ﬁnite) cost (which is not internalised by individual
citizens when they sign the petition), and the social planner would prefer to
avoid this cost.
Then a social planner would prefer the petition to gather at least qnr
signatures in state 1, and strictly less than qnr signatures in state 0. Recall
that citizens receive imperfect private signals about the state. We can say
that the petition aggregates these private signals if the outcomes replicate
the preferred decision of the social planner.
Consider the case when L < 1. At the low participation asymptotic
equilibrium, the share of citizens who sign the petition in state 1 converges
to F1 (sˆ1) < q, while at the zero participation equilibrium it converges to
0 < q. Thus, the petition fails in state 1, and hence these equilibria are not
informationally eﬃcient.
Now consider the high participation equilibrium. In the limit, as r →∞,
in state 1 the fraction of citizens who sign the petition converges to F1 (sˆ2) >
q, so the petition almost surely succeeds. In state 0, that fraction converges to
F0 (sˆ2). By Assumption 1, this is smaller than F1 (sˆ2), as monotone likelihood
ratio property implies ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. This produces the
following result:
Proposition 4. Suppose L < 1. As r → ∞, at the unique stable posit-
ive participation asymptotic equilibrium the petitioning procedure aggregates
private signals if F0 (sˆ2) < q < F1 (sˆ2), and does not aggregate private signals
if q < F0 (sˆ2) < F1 (sˆ2).
Hence, at the stable equilibrium, the petitioning procedure aggregates
private signals if and only if F0 (s) is suﬃciently far from F1 (s) at s = sˆ2.
Intuitively, this happens when the distance between F0 and F1 is suﬃciently
large  that is, when individual signals are suﬃciently informative. On the
other hand, when signals are uninformative (that is, when F0 and F1 are
similar), informational eﬃciency is not achieved.
The role of Assumption 3. Assumption 3 deﬁnes an interval of admiss-
ible values of cr for any size of the electorate. In the limit, as r → ∞ (and
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hence nr →∞), both the upper and the lower bound of the interval converge
to zero, so the interval disappears. Along the sequence, however, there exists
a range of cr for which Assumption 3 holds. This can be seen from the fact
that λnr is declining faster than e
2pi
h(s)√
q(1−q)nr
as nr increases, and hence for a
suﬃciently large r, λnr is strictly smaller than e
2pi
h(s)√
q(1−q)nr
.
The ﬁrst inequality in Assumption 3 ensures that participation levels are
distinct from zero and one. Suppose instead that cr = 0 in some voting en-
vironment r. Then the model becomes a collective action problem with zero
cost and no uncertainty about the right course of action (in other words,
a public good game with no cost of contributing). Then (4) implies that
F1 (sˆ) = 0 or F1 (sˆ) = 1, so the only symmetric equilibria are zero participa-
tion and universal participation. In these trivial (and, arguably, unrealistic)
equilibria, participation rate is not sensitive to q or to signal precision, and
hence the results of the paper do not hold.
The second inequality places an upper bound on the cost of signing the
petition. That upper bound is inversely proportional to the square root of
the number of citizens13. It is used in the proof of Lemma 2 to show that
there exist equilibria at which a citizen is pivotal with probability that is
larger than cr, so signing the petition is a dominant strategy for some signal
realisations. This ensures that (2) holds for some value of sr, and hence a
positive participation equilibrium exists.
5 Conclusions
This paper looked at e-government petitions, an instrument of political parti-
cipation that is becoming increasingly important in a number of democracies.
13This can be compared to the result in a two-candidate election with N voters: as N
grows, the probability of a voter being pivotal declines at a rate of 1√
N
if other voters vote
for each candidate with probability 12 . If other voters behave diﬀerently, the probability of
being pivotal declines at a much faster rate (Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1981). Note that
this result is based on an assumption that strategies of other voters are exogenously ﬁxed.
This paper, in contrast, focuses on equilibrium behaviour  thus, a given citizen knows
that other citizens' strategies change depending on the size of the group. Consequently,
in the comparable case when q = 12 , the probability of being pivotal still declines at a rate
that is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of citizens  even though
in the limit other citizens sign the petition with a probability that is (except in the special
case when L = 1) distinct from 12 , as Proposition 1 shows.
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Two salient features of online petitions are a large number of potential signat-
ories, and a low but positive cost of signing. To analyse this form of political
participation, the paper developed a model of collective action in which the
number of potential participants approaches inﬁnity, while the cost of par-
ticipation is bounded from above and from below. In the limit, the model
generates participation levels that are realistic, that is, distinct from zero
and from universal participation.
The paper showed that in the limit, there is a simple monotone rela-
tionship between the required quota of signatures and participation level.
Because of this, low quotas may be socially preferable. At the same time,
the paper showed that a petition can fail to aggregate individual signals
unless they are suﬃciently informative.
One assumption of the model is that citizens choose whether to sign the
petition simultaneously, or at least that they do not condition their decision
on the number of citizens that had signed the petition before them. A dif-
ferent model of online petitions could allow citizens to condition their choice
on the number of previous signatories. Future research can consider this
alternative setup.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Robbins (1955) shows that
√
2pikk+
1
2 e−ke
1
12k+1 < k! <√
2pikk+
1
2 e−ke
1
12k for all positive integers k. This implies the following weaker
result for all positive integers k:
√
2pikk+
1
2 e−k ≤ k! ≤ ekk+ 12 e−k (6)
where the ﬁrst inequality comes follows the fact that e
1
12k+1 > 1; while the
second inequality holds trivially for k = 1, and for k ≥ 2 it follows from
the fact that
√
2pie
1
12k ≤ √2pie 124 < e. Applying (6) to ( nr
qnr
)
= nr!
(qnr)!([1−q]nr)!
yields
√
2pin
nr+
1
2
r e−nr[
e (qnr)
qnr+
1
2 e−qnr
] [
e ([1− q]nr)(1−q)nr+
1
2 e−(1−q)nr
] ≤ ( nr
qnr
)
≤ en
nr+
1
2
r e−nr[√
2pi (qnr)
qnr+
1
2 e−qnr
] [√
2pi ([1− q]nr)(1−q)nr+
1
2 e−(1−q)nr
]
This can be simpliﬁed as
√
2pi
e2
1
qqnr+
1
2 (1− q)(1−q)nr+ 12 n
1
2
r
≤
(
nr
qnr
)
≤ e
2pi
1
qqnr+
1
2 ([1− q])(1−q)nr+ 12 n
1
2
r
which is equivalent to the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the left-hand side of (2) is continuous in sr,
it is suﬃcient to show that for all r ≥ r, there exist values of sr > s for
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which the left-hand side of (2) is smaller than cr; as well values of s
r > s
for which it is larger than cr. For the former, pick any s
r such that 0 <
F1 (s
r) <
[
cr
h(s)( nrqnr)
] 1
qnr
. Then h (sr)
(
nr
qnr
)
[F1 (s
r)]qnr [1− F1 (sr)](1−q)nr <
h (sr)
(
nr
qnr
)
[F1 (s
r)]qnr < h(s
r)
h(s)
cr < cr, where the last inequality follows from
Assumption 1. For the latter, let sr = F−11 (q). Then
h (sr)
(
nr
qnr
)
[F1 (s
r)]qnr [1− F1 (sr)](1−q)nr
=h (sr)
(
nr
qnr
)
qqnr (1− q)(1−q)nr ≥
√
2pi
e2
h (sr)√
q (1− q)nr
>
√
2pi
e2
h (s)√
q (1− q)nr
≥ cr
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 1, the second  from Assump-
tion 1, and the third  from Assumption 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Assumption 3, if r ≥ r, then λ ≤ c
1
nr
r ≤
(
e
2pi
h(s)√
q(1−q)nr
) 1
nr
.
Furthermore, when r is suﬃciently large, e
2pi
h(s)√
q(1−q)nr
≤ 1, so
(
e
2pi
h(s)√
q(1−q)nr
) 1
nr ≤
1. Hence, λ ≤ c
1
nr
r ≤ 1 when r is suﬃciently large. The statement of the
lemma then follows from BolzanoWeierstrass theorem.
Proof of Lemma 4. We have lim
r→∞
(√
q(1−q)
h(sr)
) 1
nr
= 1, and lim
r→∞
(√
nr
) 1
nr =
lim
n→∞
e
1
2n
lnn = 1, where the last equality comes from the fact that lim
n→∞
lnn
2n
=
lim
n→∞
1
2n
= 0 by L'Hôpital's rule. Furthermore, lim
r→∞
[F1 (s
r)]q = [F1 (sˆ)]
q, and
lim
r→∞
[1− F1 (sr)]1−q = [1− F1 (sˆ)]1−q. Finally, lim
r→∞
c
1
nr
r = L. Substituting
these equalities into (4) yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 5. We have lnA (s) = q ln [F1 (s)]+ (1− q) ln [1− F1 (s)].
Thus, d lnA(s)
dF1(s)
= q
F1(s)
− 1−q
1−F1(s) , which is strictly positive for F1 (s) < q and
strictly negative for F1 (s) > q. Hence, lnA (s) is increasing in s for F1 (s) < q
and decreasing in s for F1 (s) > q, which is equivalent to the statement of
the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let B (sˆ) ≡
[
q
F1(sˆ)
]q [
1−q
1−F1(sˆ)
]1−q
= q
q(1−q)1−q
A(sˆ)
.
Note that it is continuous. By Lemma 5, B (sˆ) has a unique local minimum
at sˆ = F−11 (q), at which its value is 1. If L = 1, this is the unique value
at which (5) holds. Suppose that L < 1. By Lemma 5, for sˆ such that
F1 (sˆ) ∈ [0, q), B (sˆ) is monotone and takes values between +∞ and 1. Hence,
on that interval it equals 1
L
at exactly one value of sˆ. The same is true for sˆ
such that F1 (sˆ) ∈ (q, 1], and hence on that interval too B (sˆ) = 1L at exactly
one value of sˆ.
Proof of Proposition 2. When L = 1, sˆ = F−11 (q) and the result follows
immediately. Suppose L < 1. Then (5) must hold at the two equilibria.
Taking the logs of (5) and diﬀerentiating it with respect to q yields ln q+1−
ln [F1 (sˆ)]− qf1(sˆ)F1(sˆ) ∂sˆ∂q − ln (1− q)− 1+ ln [1− F1 (sˆ)] +
(1−q)f1(sˆ)
1−F1(sˆ)
∂sˆ
∂q
= 0. Hence,
∂sˆ
∂q
=
ln
[
q
F1(sˆ)
]
− ln
[
1−q
1−F1(sˆ)
]
q
F1(sˆ)
− 1−q
1−F1(sˆ)
1
f1 (sˆ)
(7)
Note that when L < 1, F1 (sˆ) 6= q, and hence qF1(sˆ) 6=
1−q
1−F1(sˆ) . Since
q
F1(sˆ)
> 1−q
1−F1(sˆ) if and only if ln
[
q
F1(sˆ)
]
> ln
[
1−q
1−F1(sˆ)
]
, the numerator and the
denominator of (7) have the same sign, so ∂sˆ
∂q
> 0 at any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. If lim
r→∞
crnr = 0, then the total cost converges to
zero for any q. If lim
r→∞
crnr > 0, then the total cost converges to Fθ (sˆ) lim
r→∞
crnr,
which is strictly increasing in Fθ (sˆ). By Proposition 2, Fθ (sˆ), and hence the
total cost, is strictly increasing in q at any positive participation asymptotic
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. At the asymptotic equilibrium cutoﬀ sˆ2, when
θ = 1, the share of citizens who sign the petition converges to F1 (sˆ2) > q,
which corresponds to the planner's preferred choice. When θ = 0, the share
of signatures converges to F0 (sˆ2) < F1 (sˆ2). This outcome corresponds to
the planner's choice if F0 (sˆ2) < q but not if F0 (sˆ2) > q.
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